WPA2 turvalisus ohus

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Belgia ülikoolis avastati WPA2 4way handshake turbeviga, mis võimaldab seni turvaliseks peetud WPA2 andmevoogu õhust rünnata.  Ootame tootjapoolset tarkvarauuendust ja soovitame kõigil ajakohast infot jälgida.


Õnneks ei ole seekord vaja arendada WPA3 protokolli, WPA2 on täiesti tarkvaraliselt paigatav. Ootame Ruckuselt kiiresti AP-dele uuendusi.

Ruckuse toe kommentaarid

We have officially published the advisory id “101617” for the WPA2 vulnerabilities that were publicly disclosed yesterday onhttps://support.ruckuswireless.com/security and https://ruckuswireless.com/security.

Also read this interesting Blog from the Ruckus Room.



Key Points:

  • Ruckus products are exposed to these vulnerabilities under the following conditions:
    • If 802.11r is enabled – 802.11r is disabled by default.  It is recommended that it be disabled until infrastructure and client software have been updated.
    • Mesh and bridging deployments – No known workaround.  However, the Ruckus mesh and bridging implementation makes the practical exploitation of these vulnerabilities more challenging.
  • Ruckus will be releasing security patches to address these vulnerabilities.  Timing will be communicated as soon as possible.  See the security bulletin for the target release vehicles.
  • The attacks outlined are very sophisticated and require specialized hardware and software.  There is currently no publicly available code that enables this attack.


Ruckuse hetke lahendid

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802.11r on krüptosetingute all

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Kiri Ruckuselt

Here is further information regarding WPA2 Krack that can be used communicating with customers.


Especially note the following:

Finally, please convey to customers that they will receive software updates, regardless of support contract status.

we will be releasing multiple software patches, beginning on October 30th



By now, you are aware of the so-called KRACK vulnerability in the WPA/WPA2 protocol. You have probably received questions from your customers. We acknowledge that this communication should have come sooner.


Please be assured that addressing these vulnerabilities as they relate to Ruckus products is of the utmost importance and urgency to us. Please check and point your customers to the latest Security Advisory Bulletin (ID: 101617) on our security page. In short, we will be releasing multiple software patches, beginning on October 30th. A complete list of patches and dates will be continuously updated in this bulletin.


In the meantime, please convey to customers that there are specific steps that should be taken right now to minimize risk:

  • Disable 802.11r on the network. This step eliminates the short-term need for patches to Ruckus infrastructure in all but the two scenarios described below. By default, Ruckus disables 802.11r on all platforms.
  • Enable mechanisms at your disposal to identify a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. By default, Ruckus enables rogue detection and automatically classifies spoofed MACs as a malicious threat. Admins should also enable APs to protect against MitM attacks by de-authenticating clients connecting to a malicious rogue AP, which is required to carry out this attack.
  • Patch client devices as those patches become available from device vendors. Unpatched clients will continue to be a risk to network security, regardless of what other steps are taken.


There are two scenarios associated with Ruckus infrastructure in which the above steps will not eliminate the risk: (a) use of mesh backhaul; and (b) point-to-point links. However, successful rogue AP identification, as described above, will minimize risk. A patch is required to eliminate network vulnerability.


Full protection against KRACK will be assured once all infrastructure has been patched (and 802.11r re-enabled) and all clients have been patched.


Nevertheless, you can reassure your customers that the risk associated with this vulnerability is low. First, an attack canonly be carried out on-site by a sophisticated attacker with specialized equipment and software. There is no publicly available code to enable such an attack. Second, even a successful attack cannot be carried out on a global basis. Only a single device at a time is at risk; the risk is of having its WPA-encrypted communication with the AP decrypted. If higher-level encryption such as HTTPS/SSL, VPN or IPSec is being used, the traffic will not be visible. For a more detailed discussion, please refer to our blog post.


Finally, please convey to customers that they will receive software updates, regardless of support contract status.


Thank you in advance for your assistance in conveying these messages to your Ruckus customers.